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I. INTRODUCTION
In The Price of Inequality, Nobel Prize winning economist
Joseph E. Stiglitz explores the growing problem of wealth inequality in
the United States.1 Stiglitz, riding the momentum of the Occupy Wall
Street protests and "the 99 percent" political slogan,2 argues that
economic and political factors have worked in concert to increasingly
help shift wealth from the middle and lower classes to those at the top
of the American socioeconomic ladder. With traditional economic
models and political theory, Stiglitz analyzes the nature of wealth
inequality by examining its causes, potential ramifications if
policymakers continue to ignore it, and solutions to help reverse the
trend.
Overall, Stiglitz provides a searing indictment of the top I
percent of America's socioeconomic ladder, as well as the government
officials who pander to the requests of the wealthy. One of the central
tenants of his book is that political factors, such as policy decisions
laden with inherent trade-offs, have contributed to the growing
inequality problem just as much as economic factors. Together, these
forces have continually shifted wealth from the middle and lower
classes up the ladder to the elites of society.
In The Price of Inequality, Stiglitz's contribution to the political
discourse should not be understated. He has offered policymakers and
individuals alike a comprehensive explanation of many of the economic
problems plaguing the American system, without relying too heavily on
1. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2012) [hereinafter
STIGLITZ]. Stiglitz is an economics professor at Columbia University. He is a recipient of the
Nobel Prize in Economics (2001) and the John Bates Clark Medal (1979).
2. See generally Ezra Klein, Who are the 99 Percent?, WASHINGTON POST
WONKBLOG (Oct. 4, 2011, 9:16 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.comblogs/ezra-
klein/post/who-are-the-99-percent/2011/08/25/gIQAt87jKL-blog.html (explaining the
Occupy Wall Street protests through a series of short, individual anecdotes).
3. See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 1.
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technical jargon. Stiglitz succeeds in explaining complex and
interrelated issues in an understandable and accessible manner.
However, because Stiglitz writes for a broad audience, he provides little
detailed analysis of the legal issues associated with wealth inequality.
By building on Stiglitz's arguments, this Review contends that the legal
framework of bankruptcy laws in America was designed by the credit
industry for the credit industry, furthering inequality rather than
alleviating it. This Review identifies the strengths of Stiglitz's
arguments by applying his theories on rent seeking, lobbying and
campaign contributions, and regulatory capture to American bankruptcy
laws.
Part II will give a short overview of wealth inequality in
America and how it compares with other advanced industrialized
countries around the world.4 Part III will explain why increased
wealthy inequality is a problem and should concern policymakers.5 Part
IV will detail the causes of the problem as identified by Stiglitz, with
special emphasis on the political factors that shape the economic
landscape.6 Part V will apply Stiglitz's theories to analyze the sweeping
amendments to the United States bankruptcy laws in 2005. 7 Finally,
Section VI will briefly explore some of Stiglitz's proposed solutions to
the problem of wealthy inequality in America, while also suggesting
additional recommendations. 8
II. THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN INEQUALITY PROBLEM
A. Trends in Income and Wealth Inequality
Relying on economic indicators and leading reports, Stiglitz
concludes that American wealth and income distribution have grown
increasingly unequal over the past few decades.9 Two related trends
illustrate this point: (1) the stagnation of, and even decline in, real
income (adjusted for inflation) faced by the middle and lower class; and
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part 111.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part VI.
9. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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(2) the explosion of wealth captured by the top 1 percent of income
earners.10  Intuitively, if the middle and lower classes see no
improvement in real wages"' and the wealthy continue to become
wealthier, the gap between the two groups will inevitably grow.
2
According to the U.S. Census Bureau's income report, in 1997
the median household income (measured in 2010 dollars) was
$50,123.'3 In 2010, the median household income had actually dropped
to $49,445.14 After accounting for inflation, the average American
household was actually worse off than it was thirteen years previously.
15
These stagnating and declining real wage trends continue even over a
longer period. 16 And while the middle and lower classes have seen no
improvements to real income, America's elites have continued to
flourish. A periodically updated study conducted by Thomas Picketty
and Emmanuel Saez concluded that in 1979 the ratio of the average
household income in the top 1 percent to that of the bottom 90 percent
was 14: 1.17 By 2010, this ratio had tripted to 42:1.18
When considering wealth inequality as opposed to income
inequality, the distribution is even more skewed. 19 According to a study
conducted by the Economic Policy Institute, in 2009 the wealth held by
the wealthiest 1 percent of households was 225 times greater than that
held by the median American household.2 0  Huge concentrations of
wealth is perhaps more problematic than income inequality because it
allows larger gains from wealth holding through unearned or capital
income. 2' This enables elites to be less reliant on wages as a primary
10. Id. at3.
11. See generally Thomas Picketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United
States: 1913-1998, 118 Q. J. OF ECON. 1 (2003) (indicating that some areas of the country
have actually seen a declining of real income, rather than just stagnation).
12. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 2-3.
13. Table H-9: Type of Household-All Races by Mean and Median Income: 1980 to





17. Picketty & Saez, supra note 11, at 27.
18. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 3.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Lawrence Mishel & Josh Bivens, Occupy Wall Streeters are Right about Skewed
Economic Rewards in the United States 1 (Econ. Policy Institute, Briefing Paper No. 331,
2011).
21. See id. at 6.
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income source and further entrenches an "idle" elite class.22 However,
regardless of whether it is measured through income or wealth, Stiglitz
argues that the inequality trends are clearly present.23 For the purposes
of this analysis, unless otherwise stated, when the term "inequality" is
used, it is referring to both income and wealth distribution.
B. The Great Recession Further Entrenched Inequality Trends
While these trends have been in place for the last several
decades, the recent Great Recession has exacerbated the problem and
has further entrenched disparate wealth distribution in the United
States.24 According to Stiglitz, the Great Recession contributed to the
furthering of inequality through two distinct forces: (1) the significant
loss of wealth through the nationwide devaluation of housing; and (2) a
smaller relative reliance on wages by the wealthy.
25
The bursting of the housing bubble was devastating to millions
of Americans.26 According to a report conducted by The Center for
Responsible Lending, between the beginning of the foreclosure crisis
and November 2011, 2.7 million Americans had their homes foreclosed
on, with another 3.6 million more at risk of foreclosure in the near
future.27 Any home equity that these families had been able to amass
prior to foreclosure, which in many instances significantly contributed
to the family's overall wealth, was wiped out.28 Those who were lucky
enough to avoid foreclosure still often faced a mortgage that was
underwater, owing more on the house than it was worth on the market.
29
Since the middle and lower classes held most of their wealth in housing
rather than other investment instruments, these effects were felt most
strongly further down the socioeconomic ladder.
30
22. See id. at 6-7.
23. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 2-3.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 3, 11.
26. See generally DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
LOST GROUND, 2011: DISPARITIES IN MORTGAGE LENDING AND FORECLOSURES - EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2011), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-
lending/research-analysis/Lost-Ground-exec-summary.pdf.
27. Id. at 2.
28. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 13.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 3; see also Walter Buiter, Housing Wealth Isn't Wealth 18 (Nat'l Bureau
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As the 99 percent faced the brunt of the economic consequences
from the financial meltdown, Stiglitz argues that the top 1 percent has
been relatively isolated from the adverse economic effects.3 As hinted
at above, the wealthy are relatively less reliant on wages and housing
value compared to the middle and lower class. In fact, among the top 1
percent, 85 percent held some sort of financial asset (stock, mutual
fund, trust funds, etc.) as compared to only 23 percent of the middle
class. 32 Compared to the lower class, this disparity is even worse.3 3 Put
another way, whereas 77 percent of the middle class rely strictly on
wages, income, and housing valuation, only 15 percent of the wealthy
heavily rely on these types of earnings. Because of their ability to better
diversify, the wealthy have not been decimated by the collapse of the
housing to the same extent as the rest of the population.
In addition to being relatively isolated from the housing debacle,
Stiglitz contends that the wealthy have benefited almost exclusively
from the economic recovery coming out of the recession.34 When the
financial sector began its meltdown in the fall of 2008, stock and
housing prices dropped considerably. 35 While the housing prices have
remained depressed, the stock market has seen a steady and substantial
recovery. As discussed above, the top 1 percent owns a
disproportionate amount of financial assets, specifically corporate
stock.36 While the middle and lower classes saw very little benefit from
this recovery, the elites have been well on their way to recovering their
pre-recession levels of wealth. To illustrate this point even further, the
top one percent of Americans gained ninety-three percent of the
additional income created in 2010.
3 7
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14204, 2008) ("A fall in house prices due to a
change in its fundamental value redistributes wealth from those long housing (for whom the
fundamental value of the house they own exceeds the present discounted value of their
planned future consumption of housing services) to those short housing (from whom the
fundamental value of the house they own is less than the present discounted value of their
planned future consumption of housing services.").
31. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 3.
32. Edward Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising
Debt and the Middle Class Squeeze-An Update to 2007 18 (Levy Econ. Institute, Working
Paper No. 589, 2010).
33. Id.
34. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 3.
35. Id.
36. Wolff, supra note 32, at 15-17.
37. Thomas Picketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States: 1913-
2013]
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C. American Inequality Compared to Other Industrialized and
Non-Industrialized Countries
While the American inequality trends are striking in a vacuum,
they become even more pronounced when compared to other
industrialized countries-and even to some non-industrialized
countries.38 For international comparison purposes, the most often used
measurement of inequality is the Gini coefficient.39  The Gini
coefficient attempts to measure national inequality levels through a
ratio: a measure of 1 would indicate complete inequality and a measure
of 0 would reflect perfect equality.40 Stiglitz concludes that the most
equal societies have a coefficient of around .3; the most unequal nations
have a coefficient of .5 and above.4'
According to the CIA World Fact Book, the United States Gini
coefficient in 2010 was .47.42 This coefficient makes the United States
the 42nd most unequal country in the world, falling just between
Uruguay (41) and Cameroon (43).43 Countries like Uzbekistan (78),
India (79), and Spain (104) are all significantly more equal than the
United States.44 Furthermore, when compared to the European Union
member countries and other advanced industrialized countries, the
United States had the most unequal distribution.
45
In sum, wealth and income inequality in the United States has
been a problem for decades and according to Stiglitz, the trends are only
worsening. The middle class of America is getting hollowed out as
1998 2012 Updates, http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
38. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 21-22.
39. While comparison between different countries is never an exact science, the Gini
coefficient is the measure most used by the United Nations and its Development Program
and is useful for general international comparisons.
40. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 23.
41. Id.
42. Data for the U.S. Gini Coefficient was last obtained in 2010. See Country
Comparison: Distribution of Family Income-Gini Index, CIA WORLD FACT BOOK (2009),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html.
43. The Gini coefficient is ranked from the most unequal to the most equal countries in
the world. See id. (showing that Namibia is the most unequal at number 1 and Sweden is
the most equal at number 136).
44. Other countries' inequality ranking include: United Kingdom at 91, France at 100,
Italy at 105, and Germany at 124. See id.
45. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 21-22 (citing An Overview of Growing Income
Inequalities in OECD Countries: Main Findings, OECD DIVIDED WE STAND, 21-45 (2011),
http://www.oecd.org/els/social/inequality).
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more wealth is being transferred to the elites of society. The Great
Recession has made life more difficult for those in the middle and at the
bottom, while the top 1 percent have benefited almost entirely from the
recent economic recoveries. While this problem is not completely
isolated to the United States, wealth distribution is worse in America
than in any other industrialized country in the world.
III. WHY INEQUALITY IS A PROBLEM THAT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED
While inequality is obviously a problem for the middle and
lower classes finding it harder to make ends meet, Stiglitz argues that
there are also larger, structural problems that occur when high levels of
inequality are allowed to persist.46  Because of these structural
problems, Stiglitz believes that it is in the best interests of all
Americans, including the wealthy, to address the disproportionate
distribution of wealth.47
A. Overall Decline in Economic Growth
Stiglitz argues that as the nation's wealth becomes highly
concentrated in the hands of the elites, the country's macroeconomic
health suffers in two distinct ways: (1) the country's "aggregate
demand"48 sinks below the nation's production possibility, requiring the
economy to underutilize its resources (mainly labor);49 and (2) a
diminished public investment strategy lowering overall returns on
investment. 50  These phenomena work together to weaken economic
performance in both the long and short run timeframes. I address each
factor separately below.
46. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 83.
47. Id. at 83-84.
48. See Bruce Bartlett, It's the Aggregate Demand, Stupid, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX
BLOG (Aug. 16, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/its-the-
aggregate-demand-stupid/ (defining Aggregate Demand as the total level of consumption,
investment, and government spending of the nation minus net imports).
49. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 85.
50. See id. at 93-94.
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1. Diminished Aggregate Demand
Within the Keynesian economic model, aggregate demand is the
measure of the country's total demand for finished goods and services.
Roughly speaking, when aggregate demand is higher, the country
produces more goods and services, resources are utilized, and the
economy is growing. On the other hand, when aggregate demand falls,
production of goods and services falls, resources are underutilized, and
the economy contracts. Therefore, following a Keynesian model,
stimulating aggregate demand is the best method to grow the
economy.5'
According to Stiglitz, as more of the nation's wealth is
concentrated at the top of the socioeconomic class, aggregate demand
contracts.52 One of the key components of aggregate demand is
consumption, which is the total spending by households and businesses.
Stiglitz argues that a high level of inequality puts downward pressure on
overall consumption levels.53 Stiglitz relies on the spending and saving
trends of the rich, middle class, and poor to illustrate his point.54
Perhaps intuitively, the rich save more than the middle and
lower classes. 55 In fact, according to the study conducted by K. Dynan,
J. Skinner, and S. Zeldes, the wealthy save anywhere between 15-20
percent of their yearly income.56 On the other hand, the middle and
lower classes save almost none of their yearly income, allocating it all
toward consumption. 57  As more of the country's wealth is being
diverted to the top 1 percent, less is being spent on goods and services,
diminishing consumption, and in turn, diminishing aggregate demand.58
While overall economic growth is slowed because of a decrease
in aggregate demand, Stiglitz believes that downward pressure on
51. Bartlett, supra note 48 (explaining that the only way to improve employment is to
stimulate aggregate demand).
52. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 85.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See generally Karen Dynan et al., Do the Rich Save More?, 112 J. POLITICAL
ECON., no. 2, 397 (2004) (explaining the different motives for high income households to
save more than low income households).
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 85. This concept, derived from the Keynesian Economic
Model, is called diminishing marginal propensity to consume, or diminishing MPC.
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consumption, triggered by the skewed distribution of wealth, is also one
of the main factors contributing to current high unemployment levels.
59
As touched upon briefly above, a diminished aggregate demand means
the country is not utilizing all of its resources to produce at its
maximum capabilities. While this sometimes results in idle capital, a
firm's most likely strategy is to cut labor.60 The unemployment rate
was around 8.1 percent in November 2012.61 Stiglitz calculates that if
the top 1 percent took only 15 percent of the nation's wealth (as
opposed to the 20 percent it currently gains), and if that 5 percent were
redistributed to the middle and lower class, unemployment could drop
to around 6.1 percent. 62  Further redistribution means further
unemployment rate declines.
63
2. Lower Public Investment
Stiglitz also points to a lower rate of government investment in
public goods as a consequence of less equal wealth distribution. To
come to this realization, Stiglitz relies on a basic economic tenant: in a
capitalist society, the market fails to provide goods that benefit the
public rather than individuals.64 This is because public goods such as
roads, schools, parks, and safety cost much more to implement than the
benefits to any one individual.65 In a capitalist system, it is up to the
government to provide these public goods.
Stiglitz argues that wealth inequality leads to the government
underinvesting in public goods. According to Stiglitz, "[t]he more
divided a society becomes in terms of wealth, the more reluctant the
wealthy are to spend money on the common need.",66 The very rich are
capable of providing what is generally considered public goods for
59. Id.
60. See id. at 85-86.
61. Labor Force Statistics from Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (Nov. 11, 2012), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS 14000000.
62. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 85.
63. Id.
64. Randall Holcombe, The Theory of the Theory of Public Goods, 10 REV. AUSTRIAN
ECON. 1, 1 (1997) (explaining the traditional concept of a public good, but arguing that the
basic concept of the private sector not providing public goods is an oversimplification).
65. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 92-93.
66. Id.
2013] 409
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themselves-i.e. private schools and medical care.67 Thus, those with
the most resources are unwilling to support government programs that
provide goods for the public because these people can provide most of
these goods for themselves.
Stiglitz points to the underinvestment in public education as an
example of the long run problems that can occur from diminished
government investment in public goods.68 In the last year alone, 41 of
the 50 states have made significant cuts to their public university
program, which has resulted in rising tuition nearly across the board.69
If quality education is made available to just those capable of paying
high prices for it, the possibility of advancement in society declines.7 °
Those who are currently wealthy stay wealthy, and those in the middle
to lower classes either maintain or see a deterioration of living
standards. 71 This diminishes long run mobility and further entrenches
inequality in society.72
B. Poorly Functioning Democratic System
In addition to the economic problems inequality poses, Stiglitz
identifies and analyzes political concerns associated with inequality as
well. While a discussion of the political factors involved in creating the
current inequality landscape is set forth below, this sub-section explores
why, if inequality is allowed to persist, the American democratic system
could be in peril.73
According to Stiglitz, concentration of economic power means a
concentration of political power. Stiglitz argues that America faces the
very real prospect of becoming a "one dollar one vote" society rather
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Robert Reich, Slashed Funding for Public Universities is Pushing the Middle
Class Toward Extinction, ALTERNET (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://www.altemet.org/story/154410/slashed fundingforpublicuniversities isjpushing_
the middleclasstowardextinction; see also Robert Siegel, Are Public Universities Still
Public?, NPR ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (June 21, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/06/21/155524647/are-public-universities-still-public.
70. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 19 (arguing that parental income has become a strong
leading indicator for future child income with one factor being access to quality education).
71. Id. at 19.
72. Id. at 95.
73. Id. at 119.
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than a "one person one vote" society.74 As discussed at length in the
next section, the policy choices made by Congress and governmental
agencies are less reflective of the public good and more reflective of the
interests of the top 1 percent. 75  If "one dollar one vote" trends
continue, the wealthy will "invest" in shaping the political process to
reflect their interests through lobbying and other forms of political
influence.76 This will only further entrench the inequality trends in
America.
In addition to a system less reflective of the public sentiment
and more in-line with the top 1 percent's interest, Stiglitz believes that
with more people worse off, belief in the economic and political system
will begin to erode.77 One of the distinct characteristics of a democratic
form of government is a necessary general trust in the system-a
concept Stiglitz terms "social capital., 78 Without trust and a general
belief that the system is fair, Stiglitz argues that the social fabric begins
to deteriorate.79
An illustrative example of deteriorating "social capital" in
America is the extremely poor voter turnout for the past half-century.
80
In order for a democratic system to work and best reflect the voice of
the public, people need to express their voice through voting. But
people choose not to vote when they believe that their voice is not being
heard and their vote does not matter.8' Professor Walter Burnham
explored the voting phenomenon in America in his paper, Democracy in
Peril: The American Turnout Problem and the Path to Plutocracy.82 He
believes that "a major contributor [to low voter turnout] has almost
74. Id. at 132.
75. Id. at 119.
76. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 120.
77. Id. at 121.
78. Id at 121-122.
79. Id. at 122 (offering examples of a deteriorating social fabric: a rise in violent crime,
fraud and abuse, fewer deals for fear of contract breach, weaker communal bonds).
80. Table 397: Participation in Elections for President and U.S. Representatives: 1932
to 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0397.pdf (showing 55.7 percent of
the voting-age population participated in the 2004 Presidential Election and 57.1 percent of
the voting-age population participated in the 2008 Presidential Election).
81. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 127.
82. See generally Walter Burnham, Democracy in Peril: The American Turnout
Problem and the Path to Plutocracy, 1-32 (The Roosevelt Institute, Working Paper No. 5,
2010).
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certainly been the huge, and greatly increasing, input of interest money
into campaigns in recent decades." 83 This led him to conclude that
concentration of money and low voter turnout are a "lethal combination
for democracy." 4
Stiglitz pushes Burnham's thesis even further. He writes "[t]his
is why 'power'-political power-matters so much. If economic power
in a country becomes too unevenly distributed, political consequences
will follow ... [the elite] will use their political power to tenure the
preservation of inequalities rather than the attainment of a more
egalitarian and more just economy.',8 5 Stiglitz fears the beginning of a
vicious cycle: as disillusionment grows among those at the bottom of
the economic ladder and makes these people less likely to express their
voice through voting, the politically elite gain more influence.86 The
elites use this influence to effectuate law and policy in their favor,
which further reinforces the disillusionment among the rest of society.87
Without intervention, Stiglitz believes the cycle inevitably leads to a
government unresponsive to the needs and interests of most of its
88citizens. 8
IV. THE CAUSES OF THE INEQUALITY PROBLEM
The previous sections have explored the inequality problem and
why it must be addressed. But without understanding the factors
leading to the problem, decision makers cannot correctly implement
policy that effectively and fairly leads to a more efficient distribution of
wealth. One of the central tenants of Stiglitz's argument is that the
current inequality paradigm is largely a result of political factors and
government decisions rather than abstract market forces. Because the
government is ultimately responsible for making decisions that have
inherent trade-offs, how the government weighs the relative sides of the
trade-off has implications on where wealth will be distributed. And
when government decisions consistently reflect the desires of the top 1
percent, wealth distribution will inevitably be skewed.
83. Id. at 25.
84. Id. at 1.
85. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 190-91.
86. Id. at 134.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 134-35.
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A. Rent Seeking has Distorted Economic Gains
There are many situations where markets, when left alone, do
not work. In these situations, the private incentives and social returns
are out of alignment. 89 According to Stiglitz, this most often occurs
when (1) the presence of externalities shifts costs to the public, (2) when
one side of a transaction has more information about the deal and
stronger bargaining power than the other side, or (3) when risk cannot
be offset.90 When one or more of these factors are present in a market,
it is the government's job to rectify the problem and better align social
and private interests. 91  Unfortunately, under many situations the
government has failed to correct these market failures, which has
allowed certain actors to take advantage of their positions of power.
92
Rent seeking is the process of gaining wealth, not through
productive enterprises that add to the total production of an economy,
but by transferring it away from others.93 Rent seeking can take on
many different forms, but it almost always involves one party exploiting
its position of power or superior knowledge and profiting from market
failures.94  As Stiglitz sees it, rather than providing innovative
advancements and revolutionary changes, much of the wealth amassed
by the top 1 percent has been the result of rent seeking.95 Instead of
preventing this destructive process, Stiglitz argues that government
policies have enabled, and in some instances even encouraged, rent
seeking by the wealthy.
96
89. Id. at 34.
90. Id.
91. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 33-34.
92. Id. at 34.
93. Id. at 32.
94. Id. at 40.
95. Id. at 32; see also Kevin M. Murphy et al., Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to
Growth?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 409, 409 (1993) (defining rent seeking as "any distributive
activity that takes up resources").
96. Stiglitz argues that government munificence contributes significantly to rent
seeking. He cites poorly run auctions for government contracts and mineral extraction, the
Federal Reserve discount window, and legislation designed to aid corporations' bottom line
as examples of government encouraged rent seeking. This review only explores the rent
seeking enabled by the government. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 41, 48-51.
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1. Lack of Competition: Monopolization of Markets
One manner in which rent seeking has moved wealth from the
99 percent to the top 1 percent is through monopoly profits.97 Basic
economic theory holds that large profits by one or a small group of
firms should be driven to zero as other firms enter the market to share in
the success. 98  However, in practice this is hardly the case as firms
routinely collude, establish artificial barriers to entry, and conduct
pricing strategy to deter competition. Once competition has been
effectively eliminated, monopolists can produce below and price above
optimal social levels.99 Without strong enforcement of anti-competition
laws to prevent these activities, monopoly profits can be enormous and
captured by a small percentage of the economy. 100
While there was a rash of antitrust breakups during the early
years of the twentieth century, since the 1970s and the rise of the
Chicago School's economic thought (The Chicago School) competition
laws have become significantly weakened. 10 1 The Chicago School, and
its leading economists Milton Friedman and George Stigler, believed
that free markets were naturally self-correcting and efficient, and any
government intervention would stifle efficiency. 10 2  Accordingly, the
Chicago School and other think-tank foundations advocated against a
strong antitrust policy and set out to "educate" judges, policymakers,
and the public. 10 3 Eventually judicial opinions and the Department of
Justice's antitrust enforcement policy began to reflect the Chicago
School teachings. As a result, over time the effect of anti-competition
statutes has weakened.10 4 Stiglitz argues that this has contributed to
97. Id. at 35.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 97.
100. Id. at 43; see also id at 96-97 (claiming that monopoly profits distort the economy
because of the higher prices charged when there is a lack of competition).




102. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 44.
103. Id. (specifically naming the fight wing Olin Foundation as responsible for this
education process).
104. Id. at 44-45 (pointing to Microsoft in PC operating systems and AT&T, Verizon,
T-Mobile, and Sprint in telecommunications as examples of monopoly or near monopoly
industries critical to our modem functioning society).
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large concentrations of market power held by a few firms, with the top
executives benefiting from the monopoly rents at the expense of
consumers. 
0 5
Since the financial meltdown, the Chicago School theory has
taken an intellectual beating. There has been a rash of academic writing
criticizing its lassiez-faire approach,' 0 6 with others arguing that the lax
anti-competition enforcement significantly contributed to the systemic
risk problems of the financial sector.10 7 Looking at the distinct lack of
competition in the banking industry and the enormous profits reported
each year, Stiglitz agrees that poor antitrust enforcement, combined
with a lack of regulatory oversight, is largely to blame.' 0 8 Because of
this, policymakers have begun to reconsider the country's competition
policy, with a strong call for more stringent antitrust enforcement. 
09
2. Asymmetrical Information
As the discussion on monopolization of markets indicates, basic
economic theory predicts competition in profitable industries will push
individual firm profits to zero."0) In addition to anti-competitive
practice, another way that firms avoid competition and maintain large
profits is by making markets less transparent."' The less transparent a
market is, the less information prospective buyers have about the
105. Id. at 46.
106. See generally Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get it So Wrong, THE N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sep. 6, 2009, at MM36, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/O6Economic-t.html?pagewanted=all
(arguing that the Chicago School economists' focus on the beauty and simplicity of their
economic models blinded them to the poor underlying assumptions); see also Lloyd 1.
Rudolph & Susanne H. Rudolph, Economics' Fall from Grace, 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 4,
747-48 (2010).
107. 'Too Big to Fail?': The Role of Antitrust Law in Government-Funded
Consolidation
in the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1llth Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Albert A. Foer,
President, American Antitrust Institute, Washington, DC).
108. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 46-47 (noting that, even though there are a large number
of banks across the country, the nation's four biggest banks control nearly half of the
country's banking assets, limiting competitive pricing practice).
109. Balto, supra note 101; see also Prepared Remarks, Christine Varney, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, Vigorously Enforcing Antitrust Laws in the
Obama Administration (July 12, 2011).
110. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 35.
111. Id.
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product in question. 1 2  Buyers, who participate in the market
sporadically, are unlikely to obtain the necessary information, and the
sellers can thus take advantage of their superior power in the
transaction. 1 3
One area where transparency problems are particularly troubling
to Stiglitz is in the financial services industry. He blames much of the
recent troubles in the financial markets on a lack of transparency and
asymmetrical information between the sellers and buyers of derivatives
and other financial products. 1 4  Specifically, Stiglitz argues that a
hallmark of the financial service industry in recent decades, the over-
the-counter]1 5 derivatives market, has made it difficult for customers to
understand associated risks.' 6  Stiglitz believes that the lack of
transparency in derivatives markets hid the excessive risk associated
with the products, increased the profits of banks at the expense of
customers, and lowered economic performance.' 17
B. Shaping Policy and Perception
Stiglitz rejects the notion that abstract market forces are to
blame for America's current wealth distribution problems. 1 8 Markets
do not exist in a vacuum as traditional economic models assume.
Instead, markets are shaped by laws and regulations that, because of
inherent trade-offs, can have enormous distributive effects."l 9
Depending on how the policymaker weighs the trade-offs, they can
either work to even the playing field or further entrench inequality.12 0
112. Id.
113. Id. at 35-36; see also Dale Morse, Asymmetrical Information in Securities Markets
and Trading Volume, 15 THE J. FIN. AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1129, 1129 (1980)
(explaining the role of information asymmetries between buyers and sellers of financial
goods).
114. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 35-36.
115. See Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT'L SWAPS AND
DERIVATIVES ASSoc. (2012), http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html (defining over-the-
counter derivatives as "customized, bilateral agreements that transfer risk from one party to
the other.").
116. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 35.
117. Id. at 36 (claiming that banks purposely hide their true financial position in part
through derivatives transactions).
118. Id. at 52.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 59 (explaining globalization effects, stating "nowhere do politics shape
market forces more than in the globalization arena").
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Stiglitz believes that, unfortunately for most of America, the wealthy
hold a considerable amount of influence over policymakers and the
perceptions of the population in general. This influence has consistently
resulted in policies designed to protect the interests of the wealthy over
those of the rest of society and further entrench the inequality trends.
12 1
1. Lobbying and Campaign Contribution
Stiglitz argues that as wealth becomes more skewed and society
less equal, the wealthy hold a disproportionate amount of influence over
policy decisions. 122 Stiglitz sets forth two factors that contribute to the
wealthy's increased influence over decision makers: (1) the wealthy
have more at stake with each change in policy and thus have more
incentive to get involved in the decision-making process; and (2) the
wealthy have resources to spend on lobbying and campaign
contributions to actually influence the decisions.
23
One area in which these factors are manifested is through
lobbying efforts. To Stiglitz, lobbying is just a method of marketing
ideas rather than goods or services; like marketing, lobbying is a form
of "investment."' 124 Not unlike traditional marketing mechanisms,
corporations, industries, and wealthy individuals engage in lobbying to
shape politicians' worldview and effectuate beneficial policies.
Furthermore, when lobbying is effective, it not only ensures a particular
policy is enacted, but it can work to gather the support of a politician's
constituents. 25 As Stiglitz argues, "[p]ersuading politicians to adopt
one's perspectives and perceptions has a double advantage: not only do
they sell the ideas to the public; they translate the ideas into legislation
and regulation.' ' 126 According to Stiglitz, because lobbying is a form of
investment for large corporations and the wealthy, it usually results in
substantial returns on investment through favorable laws and regulatory
policy. 127
121. Id. at 52-53.
122. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 120.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 120, 160 (stating "if goods can be marketed, so can ideas and especially the
ideas that underpin policies")
125. Id. at 161.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 120.
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Lobbying has become ever more prevalent in American society.
Just two sectors, the health industry (which includes pharmaceutical
companies) and the energy and natural resources industry, employ over
5,200 lobbyists-nearly 10 lobbyists per congressman.'28  It is
estimated that the financial industry employees roughly 2.5 lobbyist per
congressman on its own. 1 2 9 In total, just over $3.3 billion was spent in
2011 on lobbying, with the number expected to reach even higher.1 30
Like rent seeking, Stiglitz believes that huge expenditures on lobbying
are an unproductive waste of resources designed to merely distort the
political and economic system.1 31  With a further concentration of
wealth, the importance of lobbying to shape policy will only increase,
while laws and regulations will represent the interests of the
economically powerful at the expense of the rest of society.1 32
In addition to the wealthy spending on lobbying to effectuate
policy changes, campaign contributions can be an effective method for
shaping policy as well.133 While the concern about corporate influence
through large contributions is not new, thanks to the 2010 Supreme
Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,134
corporations and other organizations are unfettered in the amount they
can contribute to campaign advertisements and other political
communications. 35  In maintaining a corporate freedom of speech,
Stiglitz believes the Citizens United decision further alienates individual
citizens and gives even more political influence to corporations. 36
With corporations and other large businesses' ability to access
enormous pools of resources, Citizens United ensures that politicians
128. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 95 (citing Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct.
31, 2012), http://www. opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php).
129. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 48.
130. Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 31, 2012),
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php (showing that 2010 saw the highest levels of
expenditures on lobbying in history, with over $5.5 billion).
131. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 95.
132. Id. at 120.
133. Id. at 131 (arguing that large campaign contributions contributes to a "one-dollar
one-vote" system).
134. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (ruling that "[t]he
Government may not render a ban on political speech constitutional by carving out a limited
exemption through an amorphous regulatory interpretation").
135. Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
217, 220 (2010).
136. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 131.
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will consider placating these entities to finance their campaign
communications. 37  Stiglitz fears this will lead to stronger
commitments by politicians to push policy that benefits corporations-
and the wealthy that run the corporations-rather than the public
good.1
38
2. Capture and Shaping Perceptions
Large expenditures in lobbying and campaign contributions are
examples of direct methods of influence over elected officials.
Agencies often give in to the interests of corporations and the wealthy
individuals who run them.' 39 Stiglitz believes regulatory agencies such
as the Federal Communications Commission, the Securities and
Exchanges Commission, and the Federal Reserve have all, in certain
circumstances, succumbed to this influence. 40 It is manifested in two
ways: (1) regulatory capture, and (2) cognitive capture. 14 1
Regulatory capture occurs when those in the regulatory agency
come from, or plan to go into, the industry they are charged with
regulating. 142  When regulatory capture is in full force, rather than
pushing for policy enforcement that might be beneficial for the public
good, agencies create and enforce regulations that are more in line with
the interests of the industry. 143 Agency policy, therefore, reflects the
influence of special interests that can offer regulators pecuniary
incentives following their government employment. 144 In practice, the
revolving door 45 phenomenon is real. Hundreds of revolving door
employees have worked or currently work for the largest agencies in the
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 47.
140. Id.
141. Id. at47-48.
142. Id. at 47.
143. Michael Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 167, 169 (1990).
144. Id. at 169 n.6 ("[W]ell organized subgroups of the general population use
government power to force wealth transfers in their favor.") (emphasis added).
145. The revolving door is a term used to define the movement of government
employees to interest groups and other lobbyist capacities and vice versa, taking advantage
of the connections made during government work. See Andrew Baker, Restraining
Regulatory Capture? Anglo-America, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global
Financial Governance, 86 INT'L AFF. 3, 652 (2010).
2013] 419
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
United States government. 146 While certainly not all of these revolving
door regulators neglect their civic duties, if enough agency personnel
are more in line with the industry than the public, policy and regulation
can suffer. 1
47
Instead of the motivation of pecuniary incentives being the
driving force, cognitive capture occurs when the regulators and the
industry they are designed to regulate share the same mindset.1
48
Professor Barry Eichengreen of the University of California at Berkeley
describes cognitive capture: "the attitudes of regulators may be infected
not merely by the practices and attitudes of their fellow regulators, but
also by those of the regulated. 1 49  Stiglitz argues that while neither
Alan Greenspan nor Tim Geithner worked for the banking industry
prior to their employment for the Federal Reserve and Department of
the Treasury respectively, they both held a similar ethos: weak
regulations on big banks resulted in the most efficient financial
system. 150  When the regulators and the industry share similar
assumptions, the agency fails to achieve its goal of limiting risk and
maintaining the public good, with the worst case scenario occuring in
the fall of 2008."l
In essence, expenditures on lobbying and campaign
contributions and the capture phenomenon are part of a broader attempt
by the wealthy to shape perceptions to align with their own interests.
52
Stiglitz argues that large business and the wealthy have been
consistently successful at influencing the beliefs and preferences of the
rest of society for their own gain. 153 Many times the top 1 percent shape
146. See Revolving Door: Top Agencies, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/top.php?display=G (last visited Jan. 17, 2013)
(showing the agencies with the largest revolving door employees, including the Department
of Commerce with 432, the Department of Justice with 216, and the Department of Treasury
with 199).
147. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 47.
148. ld. at 48.
149. Barry Eichengreen, The Last Temptation of Risk, NAT'L INT., May/June 2009, at 4,
available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-last-temptation-of-risk-3091 (blaming
policymaker's, regulator's, and academia's cognitive capture as a reason for the financial
meltdown and the inability to identify the risks).
150. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 48.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 166 (explaining that battles over discrete policies are just a subsection of the
larger battle over perceptions.).
153. Id. at 148.
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perceptions with direct monetary efforts, other times it is through
testimony and statistics from experts that support a particular view.
1 54
Just as modem marketing influences consumers' consumption
preferences, framing the issues of a debate in a particular light or
convincing policymakers to accept certain beliefs can have broad
implications for a favorable public image and beneficial legislation.
155
V. EXPLAINING THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005156
Stiglitz's theories can help to explain why significant changes to
American bankruptcy laws were adopted in 2005, and how these laws
have furthered economic inequality. While Stiglitz does not spend
much time exploring the 2005 bankruptcy changes, he is extremely
critical of the current bankruptcy paradigm. In fact, he considers
current American bankruptcy laws as "a system of 'partial indentured
servitude"' and he advocates heavily for reform.
157
While the essence of bankruptcy law is to assign the rights and
liabilities between debtors and creditors, 158 the manner in which the
laws are designed have strong implications for wealth distribution and
lending incentives. 159 When bankruptcy laws are more lenient-with
easier to discharge debt and flexible payback systems-the filing party
is able to retain more of their property and wealth through a bankruptcy
proceeding. 160  On the other hand, when bankruptcy laws are less
debtor-friendly, the filing party has a harder time discharging debts and
more of their property and wealth is transferred to their creditors.
161
154. Id. at 162 (arguing that any side of a debate can find an expert capable of
supporting that side through studies or empirical research).
155. Id. at 147-48 ("[T]he 1 percent have shaped beliefs about what is fair and efficient,
about the strengths and weaknesses of the government, and even about the extent of
inequality in America."); see also id. at 161 (arguing that one of the most effective ways to
shape public opinion is through the capture of politicians and regulators).
156. Because Stiglitz writes for a broad audience and tackles multiple issues, he declines
to fully explore the legal framework of any one issue. This section will apply some of the
theories Stiglitz offers to the bankruptcy system in America, and argue that Stiglitz's
theories have substantial merit.
157. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 194.
158. See In re Pommerer, 10 B.R. 935 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
159. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 193.
160. Id.
161. Id. Furthermore, bankruptcy laws allocate risk. Id. When bankruptcy laws are
stricter, there is less incentive to be prudential with lending. Id. This increases the
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Because of this unique impact on resource allocation, the rest of this
review will focus on the 2005 changes to the Bankruptcy Code.
A. Background and Key Provisions of BAPCPA
On April 20, 2005, President Bush signed the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005162 (BAPCPA
or Act) into law, ending over a decade of legislative debate and intense
lobbying efforts by the banking 163 and credit card industries.' 6 4  The
BAPCPA marked the largest modification of federal bankruptcy law
since the Bankruptcy Code was passed in 1978.165 Through a series of
amendments, the Act has significantly altered the procedures associated
with bankruptcy filings, limited judicial discretion in bankruptcy cases,
and redefined the debtor-creditor relationship. 66  In essence, it has
increased the costs and decreased the effectiveness of bankruptcy
relief.16
7
In the most basic sense, the Act was passed in response to the
rising number of consumer bankruptcy filings since the original
Bankruptcy Code was passed in 1978.168 In 2004, the year before the
Act was passed, there were more than 1.5 million bankruptcies filed in
the United States. 169  While increased bankruptcy proceedings had
likelihood of predatory and risky lending.
162. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-08, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
BAPCPAI.
163. I include banks in the discussion because large banks, including Bank of America
and J.P. Morgan Chase, control several of the top card issuers. For the rest of the
discussion, the simple description "credit card companies" will be used.
164. Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 485 (2005).
165. See Dariely Rodriguez, Left Behind: The Impact of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 on Economic, Social, and Racial Justice, 18
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65, 65 (2007). The 1978 Bankruptcy Code superseded the original
bankruptcy act of 1898.
166. George H. Singer, The Year in Review: Case Law Developments under the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 82 N.D. L. REV. 297,
304 (2006).
167. For a good discussion of the BAPCPA and its role in the financial crisis, see
Melissa Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 115
(2009).
168. James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 Mo. L. REV. 863, 863 (2006).
169. Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 1463, 1464 (2005).
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affected numerous areas of the American economy, the industry most
notably harmed was the credit card industry. 170 Prior to the enactment
of BAPCPA, it is estimated that credit card companies were losing
roughly $4 billion annually due to discharged debt through bankruptcy
filings. 171 Significantly, while the Act has changed some procedural
methods in business and farm bankruptcies, its greatest impact is in
consumer cases, which most often involve credit card debt.172 Not
coincidentally, credit card companies saw record profits in both 2006
and 2007, the years immediately following implementation of
BAPCPA's modifications.
173
1. Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Law
A quick overview of the consumer bankruptcy paradigm is
required to understand the changes associated with BAPCPA. There are
essentially two methods for personal bankruptcy: Chapter 7174
Liquidation and Chapter 13175 Rehabilitation. 76 Under a Chapter 7
proceeding, the debtor's non-exempt assets are sold to pay off the non-
dischargeable debts. 177 The Chapter 7 proceeding, however, identifies
many types of debts as dischargeable--debts that, after the bankruptcy
proceeding, the filing party is not legally obligated to repay. 178 Among
those considered dischargeable are debts accrued from unpaid medical
costs, financial company loans, and unsecured debt, including credit
card debt.1 79 Importantly for this discussion, Chapter 7 bankruptcy does
170. Robert H. Scott, III, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005: How the Credit Card Industry's Perseverance Paid Off 41 J. ECON. IsSUES 943, 943
(2007).
171. William Waller, Kickin'em While They're Down: Consumer Bankruptcy Reform,
35 J. ECON. IssuEs 871, 871 (2001).
172. Ronald Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007
U. ILL. L. REv. 375, 375 (2007).
173. Michael Simkovic, The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and
Prices, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 19 (2009).
174. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-84 (2006).
175. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 (2006).
176. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY HORNBOOK SERIES, §§ 1-9 (West Publ'n
Co., 1993).
177. Id. (explaining that exempt assets generally include the family house or family
transportation method).
178. Id.
179. Scott, supra note 170, at 944 (emphasis added).
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not discharge mortgage or education loans, alimony, child support, or
outstanding tax debt.1
8 0
As opposed to liquidation under Chapter 7, a Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceeding deals with rehabilitation.'18  In a rehabilitation
case, creditors look to the future earnings of the debtor, not to the
property of the debtor at the time the bankruptcy proceeding is initiated,
to satisfy their claims. 82 Chapter 13 bankruptcies require the consumer
to repay his debts through a structured repayment schedule, typically
over a three- to five-year period as specified by the bankruptcy court.1
8 3
Unlike Chapter 7, in a Chapter 13 filing the debts of the consumer are
not considered immediately dischargeable. 8 4 Furthermore, under the
colloquial "best interest of creditors test," in order for a Chapter 13 case
to proceed, unsecured creditors must be paid at least as much as they
would have been paid under a hypothetical Chapter 7 filing.1
85
Therefore, no unsecured creditor will ever be worse off under a Chapter
13 filing than under a Chapter 7 filing. In fact, more often than not,
under a Chapter 13 proceeding, unsecured creditors, such as credit card
lenders, are better off through the court appointed scheduled repayment
than through a liquidation filing.1
8 6
2. Means Testing
One of the ways BAPCPA changed consumer bankruptcy cases
is through the new "means testing. '8 7 The means testing provision has
been described as the "heart" of the bankruptcy reform.'8 8  Prior to
BAPCPA, bankruptcy courts were generally deferential to a debtor's
choice of Chapter 7 filing over Chapter 13.189 BAPCPA's new means
test provision, however, is designed to establish a presumption that
180. Id.
181. EPSTEIN, supra note 176, at §§ 1-9.
182. Id.
183. Scott, supra note 170, at 944.
184. Id.
185. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2006).
186. Scott, supra note 170, at 944.
187. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
188. Ransom v. FIA Card Services, 131 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2011) (citing H.R. REP. No.
109-3 1, pt. 1, p. 2 (2005)).
189. Eugene Wedoff, Means Testing in the New 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 234
(2005) [hereinafter Wedoff, Means Testing], available at LN 102K7T.
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filing Chapter 7 is an abuse of the bankruptcy laws to discharge debts
when it may be possible for the debtor to repay the debt through future
income. 190 The presumption of abuse is controlled through the means
test.191
The means test has three steps designed to quantify the debtor's
payback ability: (1) identify the total monthly income available to the
debtor; (2) subtract any deductions allowed in determining available
income pursuant to section 707(b)(2); and (3) compare the available
income minus deductions to an income threshold dictated by the size of
the household and the median income data for the state in which the
filing occurs. 192 If the available monthly income is above these pre-
determined thresholds, the presumption of abuse is triggered. 19 3 The
bankruptcy court is then required to dismiss the Chapter 7 proceeding
and force the debtor into Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
94
The differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy
cases illustrate the benefits credit card companies reap from the means
test. As previously explained, Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharges
unsecured debt, including credit card debt. Chapter 13, on the other
hand, does not discharge debt and forces the debtor to adhere to a
payment schedule. The best interest of the creditor test ensures that
unsecured creditors are at least as well off, and more times than not
better off, under Chapter 13 as opposed to Chapter 7. As the means test
prevents more debtors from discharging their credit card debt, the credit
card industry stands to recoup much more than under the previous
bankruptcy framework. 195  Furthermore, this process has been at the
expense of the financially insecure, allowing fewer debtors the "fresh
start" bankruptcy laws were initially designed to provide. 96  In fact,
190. Id.
191. Eugene Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 31, 49 (2007) [hereinafter Wedoff, Consumer Bankruptcy Effects].
192. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2006) (setting forth the disposable income test); Eugene
Wedoff, Consumer Bankruptcy Effects, supra note 191, at 49.
193. Wedoff, Consumer Bankruptcy Effects, supra note 191, at 49.
194. Mann, supra note 172, at 381 (noting that the presumption is rebutted only with a
detailed report outlining special circumstances that require more monthly allowance than the
state median).
195. Scott, supra note 170, at 944. Importantly, mortgage loans, student loans for
education, child support and alimony are not discharged through either Chapter 7 or Chapter
13. These areas have gained nothing through the means test.
196. See generally Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934) (explaining that
the "fresh start" offered from bankruptcy laws is a matter of "great public concern.").
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Chapter 7 filings dropped from 70 percent of all personal bankruptcy
cases pre-BAPCPA to just below 30 percent after BAPCPA was
enacted. 197
3. Delayed Filings
In addition to the benefits credit card companies accrued from
the means testing provision, the BAPCPA includes provisions that force
debtors to defer filing for bankruptcy.198 While on the surface it seems
counter-intuitive for a legislative scheme to slow the process of filings
and reduce efficiency, when considering the unique business model of
the credit card industry this makes perfect sense. 199 Unlike most types
of traditional lenders, whose most profitable customers are those least
likely to default, credit card companies extract most of their profits from
customers who face financial insecurity.20 0 For credit card companies,
the largest percentage of profits comes from interest income, late fees,
and overdraft fees.2 0' Financially distressed borrowers and those who
carry a monthly debt balance consistently rack up these charges.
20 2
Thus, when financially distressed borrowers carrying a monthly debt
balance are forced to wait several months for a needed bankruptcy
filing, interest and other late fees continue to pile up, adding to the total
debt owed to a credit card issuer.
There are several provisions in the BAPCPA that delay
bankruptcy filings and thus require the debtor to accrue more interest on
their outstanding debt. Under BAPCPA section 312, the time between
discharges is extended.20 3 If a debtor has previously filed a Chapter 7
liquidation proceeding, the debtor must wait 8 years from the prior case
to file for Chapter 7, and 4 years to file for Chapter 13.204 If a debtor
has previously filed a Chapter 13 rehabilitation proceeding, the debtor
197. Scott, supra note 170, at 944.
198. Mann, supra note 172, at 384.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 384-85 ("Financially secure customers ... do not generate any interest
income, late fees, or overlimit penalties.").
201. Id. at 385 (stating that annual fees only account for 20% of the credit industry's
revenue).
202. Id.
203. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, § 211, 86-87 (2005) (amending 11
U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2006)).
204. Wedoff, Consumer Bankruptcy Effects, supra note 191, at 49.
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must wait 6 years to file Chapter 7, and 2 years to file Chapter 13.205
This extended time required between filings elongates the window in
which bankruptcy relief is unavailable to a debtor, during which late
fees and other charges accrue.2 °6
Furthermore, the BAPCPA establishes credit counseling and
debtor education as a requirement for any bankruptcy filing.20 7 Prior to
filing, a debtor must receive counseling from a nonprofit budget-
counseling agency within 180 days of the filing.20 8 This is another
obstacle a debtor must hurdle in his attempt for debt relief and there is a
compelling argument that the credit counseling requirement does
nothing to prevent future financial problems. 20 9 In addition, provisions
such as attorney penalties for filing Chapter 7 when the means test
points to Chapter 13210 and raising the filing fees from $250 to $299 are
other requirements that raise more hurdles to filing while the credit card
companies continue to levy fees. l l
B. Rent Seeking by Banks and Credit Card Companies
As the previous subsection explains, many key provisions of the
BAPCPA have had the effect of improving the credit card companies'
balance sheet at the expense of the bankrupt parties.212 Prior to 2005
and the enactment of BAPCPA, however, it was not inevitable that
bankruptcy laws would be so heavily tailored to the credit industry.213
Several factors contributed to the eventual paradigm, many of which
Stiglitz identified in his analysis of American inequality. Specifically,
205. Id.
206. See Mann, supra note 172, at 392-93.
207. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §106(a), 119 Stat. 23, 37 (2005) (adding 11 U.S.C. §
109(h) (2006)); Wedoff, Consumer Bankruptcy Effects, supra note 191, at 36.
208. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 23, 37 (2005) (adding 11 U.S.C. §
109(h) (2006)).
209. Scott, supra note 170, at 946 (arguing that the credit counseling only leads about
3.2% of people away from bankruptcy and toward a debt management plan).
210. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §102, 119 Stat. 23, 27-35 (2005) (amending 11
U.S.C. § 707 (2006)).
211. Ronald Mann describes the time between the onset of financial distress and
bankruptcy filing as a "Sweat Box." During this time, the debtor accrues interest on the
unpaid debt, but cannot find relief through bankruptcy. See generally Mann, supra note
172.
212. See generally Simkovic, supra note 173, at 19 (explaining that in 2006 and 2007
credit card companies saw record profits).
213. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 194.
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the credit industry's effective rent seeking placed it in a position of
immense political strength and gave it significant leverage over any
proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code.
1. Monopolization of the Credit Market
As Stiglitz contends, the rise of the Chicago School and the
decline in antitrust enforcement had powerful effects on the
214
concentration of wealth and power in many industries. In the years
preceding the BAPCPA, the credit card industry was largely left alone
by antitrust enforcers, and as a result became increasingly
monopolized.215 In fact, in 2005, the top ten credit card issuers
represented nearly 87 percent of all general outstanding credit card
debt,216 up from 57 percent of the general outstanding credit card debt
for the top ten issuers in 1995.217 While the market shares for a smaller
percentage of companies have increased, the total pool of outstanding
credit card debt has ballooned. Over that same period, 1995-2005, the
level of outstanding revolving debt grew from $378 billion to over $815
billion. 2
18
The combined effect of a larger market share going to a smaller
pool of corporations, along with the importance of credit card debt in
American consumerism, has seen the credit card industry grow in
economic prominence. In 1995 the industry pulled in roughly $14
billion in pre-tax profits. 219 By 2005, the pre-tax profits for the industry
more than doubled, reaching more than $31 billion.220 Stiglitz predicts
214. Id. at 44; Ronald Mann also blames technological pressures of data mining and
costs of acquiring information as a factor contributing to the monopolization of the credit
industry. See Mann, supra note 172, at 385.
215. See Simkovic, supra note 173, at 17.
216. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-11-311, CONSUMER COSTS FOR DEBT
PROTECTION PRODUCTS CAN BE SUBSTANTIAL RELATIVE TO BENEFITS BUT ARE NOT A Focus
OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 33 (2011) [hereinafter Gov't Accountability Office] (citing HSN
Consultants Inc., The Nilson Report, 966 Feb. 2011, at 8-9). By 2007, the concentration was
even greater, with the top ten companies commanding over 93 percent of the outstanding
debt.
217. See Simkovic, supra note 173, at 20.
218. Consumer Credit Outstanding (Levels), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/HIST/cchist-mt-levels.html (last updated Jan.
8, 2013). As of August 2012, the outstanding revolving debt was $854 billion.
219. See Simkovic, supra note 173, at 19.
220. Id. (noting that rising trends have continued through 2007, with record pre-tax
profits of over $41 billion).
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that a concentration of economic power translates into a concentration
of political influence.221 In the example of the credit card industry, the
concentrated economic power had significant implications for the
BAPCPA.222
2. Asymmetrical Information
In addition to an increased monopolization of credit markets
leading to economic prosperity, card-issuing companies often took
advantage of asymmetrical information market failures to amass
economic and political influence.223 As Stiglitz points out in his
discussion of market failures, markets, especially financial markets,
require the buyer and seller to have similar knowledge about the
transaction in order for it to function properly.224 Without relatively
symmetrical information, the seller can charge a higher rate than
competitively feasible, and the buyer has no way of better positioning
himself in the market. 5 For the years prior to BAPCPA, credit card
companies routinely limited the information disseminated to consumers,
while relying on their superior knowledge of the market to extract high
profits.226
The information asymmetries in the credit market have
manipulated competitive pricing mechanisms and made it nearly
impossible for consumers to comparison shop and make informed
decisions.227  According to the United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and studies conducted by the Federal
Reserve, many consumers find it difficult to assess financial services
and products. 228 Credit card companies employ complex, multi-tiered
221. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 132.
222. See Simkovic, supra note 173, at 19; see also infra Part V.C.
223. Simkovic, supra note 173, at 21.
224. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 34.
225. Id.
226. Simkovic, supra note 173, at 21. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure Act of 2009 was designed to alleviate some of these concerns, but it has
been met with mixed reviews, many arguing that more reform is needed. See generally
Jaclyn Rodriguez, The Credit CARD Act of 2009: An Effective but Incomplete Solution
Evidencing the Need for a Federal Regulator, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 309 (2010).
227. Simkovic, supra note 173, at 21.
228. GOV'T ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 216, at 33 (indicating that while the Credit CARD
Act of 2009 was designed to alleviate some of these concerns, problems with transparency
exist even after its enactment).
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pricing policies by including multiple factors that contribute to the
overall "price" of the product.229 Studies show that consumers routinely
choose cards that advertise low introductory rates, ignoring that fact that
these cards are likely to cost more money in the long run due to higher
interest fees and rates that increase over time.230  Furthermore, when
faced with attempting to calculate the total price of a particular credit
card, consumers routinely underestimated the fees levied when one
carries monthly debt.231  As Stiglitz contends, without properly
understanding the market, the consumer cannot effectively assess the
value of a product and thus will overpay.232 This contributes to higher
rents for the corporation, and less downward pricing pressure forced by
consumers with adequate information.
233
Through both an increased monopolization of the credit market
and the inability of consumers to comparison shop, the top of the credit
industry reaped significant profits in the decade preceding BAPCPA.
These rent seeking techniques-and the general increased reliance on
debt by the American consumer-enabled the credit card industry to
ascended into a prominent economic and political position. As
Stiglitz's theories on the negative effects of wealth inequality explains,
the credit industry used its position of power to shape the BAPCPA in
its best interest.
C. Shaping Policy and Perception
Stiglitz's theories concerning the wealthy exerting political
influence over policymakers is directly applicable to the credit card
industry and the passage of BAPCPA. Through an intense lobbying
effort and significant campaign contributions, plus shaping the mindset
229. Simkovic, supra note 173, at 21.
230. Sumit Agarwal et al., Learning in the Credit Card Market (Nat'l Bureau Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13822, 2011), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w 13822.
231. Adam Levitin, A Critique of the American Bankers Association's Study of Credit
Card Regulation (Business, Econ. and Regulatory Policy, Working Paper No. 11044327,
2008), available at http://papers. ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id = 1029191.
232. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 35-36.
233. See id.; see also, Simkovic, supra note 173, at 22 (proving that the credit card
market is not price competitive by showing that after BAPCPA, none of the credit card
companies dropped their fees or grace periods; companies were not forced to pass their
gains on to consumers, meaning there was no price-competition in the industry).
[Vol. 17430
THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY AND BAPCPA
of the general public, the credit card industry effectively manipulated
the bankruptcy reform debate. Their efforts are manifested in the key
provisions of the BAPCPA.
1. Lobbying and Campaign Contributions
Stiglitz contends that lobbying expenditures by industries can
have a significant impact on how laws and regulations are shaped.234
This is especially true in the area of bankruptcy laws. During the
buildup to BAPCPA, Professor Elizabeth Warren 235 wrote, "bankruptcy
is much more the province of interest groups [rather than professionals
in the field] that have spent millions to hire lobbyists, to launch a public




As she noted, bankruptcy laws can have huge implications for profits
and because of this, there are strong incentives to influence policy
creation.237  Various Congressmen throughout the BAPCPA's
legislative history echoed Professor Warren's concern about corporate
influence over bankruptcy laws.238
Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, credit card companies made
significant contributions to political campaigns in an effort to garner
support for bankruptcy reform.239  President Clinton, cautious of
bankruptcy reforms too tailored for the financial industry at the expense
of debtors, had continuously threatened to veto any bankruptcy bill that
he felt was unbalanced.24 ° Prior to the 2000 Presidential campaign,
Republican candidate George W. Bush made it clear he supported the
proposed bankruptcy reform.241  Not coincidentally, MBNA, the
world's largest credit card issuer at the time, was the biggest contributor
234. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 160.
235. Professor Warren is a Harvard Law School Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law and a
specialist in American Bankruptcy laws. In 2012 she was elected to the U.S. Senate from
Massachusetts and frontrunner to take a seat on the Senate Banking Committee.
236. Elizabeth Warren, The Market For Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in
Shaping the Law, Wisc. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002).
237. Id.
238. See generally Jensen, supra note 164; 144 CONG. REc. H10225 (daily ed. Oct 9,
1998) (statement of Rep. Nadler) (arguing that the bill was written "by and for" credit card
companies).
239. Warren, supra note 236, at 9.
240. Jenson, supra note 164, at 534-539 (noting that in 2000, President Clinton rejected
BAPCPA's predecessor bill through a pocket veto).
241. Warren, supra note 236, at 9.
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to the Bush campaign.242 President Bush's election in 2000 was a
significant step toward enacting BAPCPA.243
In addition to garnering general support for bankruptcy reform,
in the decade during which the BAPCPA was being debated in
Congress, credit card companies spent millions on lobbying efforts in an
attempt to influence particular provisions of the law.244 In just five
years, MBNA spent over $17 million in lobbying.245 The credit card
industry as a whole spent an estimated $100 million or more from 1995
to 2005 in lobbying to influence the bankruptcy reform.24 6 The means
testing approach for determining Chapter 7 eligibility, considered the
"heart" of the reform, was strongly supported by the credit card
industry.247
2. Capture and Shaping Perceptions
While the credit industry spent millions on direct contributions
to influence the proposed bankruptcy bill and garner support from
politicians, it also campaigned heavily to shape the perceptions of the
rest of society.248 The credit industry understood that politicians, no
matter how much money was donated to campaign contributions, would
be hesitant to support a bill that was widely seen as special interest
legislation.249 Therefore, in an attempt to alter the perceptions of the
bankruptcy reform bill, the industry funded a powerful public relations
campaign.25 °
The main justification proffered by the proponents of the more
creditor-friendly bankruptcy paradigm was that it would benefit the
average American household.251 The credit industry purchased a slew
242. Id. (citing Robert Zausner & Josh Goldstein, Bush's Largest Funding Source:
Employees of Credit-Card Firm, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jul. 28, 2000, at Al).
243. Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper no. 13265, 2007) available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 3265.
244. Scott, supra note 170, at 945.
245. Id. (noting that MBNA was acquired by Bank of America in 2006).
246. White, supra note 243, at 2.
247. See Jensen, supra note 164, at 534-539 (explaining the development of the means
test as a measure ofpayback ability).
248. Warren, supra note 236, at 9.
249. Id. at 12.
250. Id.
251. Simkovic, supra note 173, at 2.
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of newspaper advertisements and funded press releases that all claimed
abusive bankruptcies cost each American family $400 a year.25 2 The
$400 savings was cited in studies and became the lead argument for
proponents of the bill.253 While years later a lobbyist employed by the
credit card industry took credit for fabricating the $400 "fact, 2 54 it was
critical to the passage of BAPCPA 5
Consistent with Stiglitz's prediction,, the economically-
powerful credit card industry relied on a simple message to shape
perceptions and convince the general public to adopt its interests.256
Professor Warren argues that the $400 "fact," combined with the rest of
the public relations ad gave politicians "political cover" to support the
bankruptcy reform.257 The fact that the $400 claim was mathematically
implausible mattered little; 258 the credit industry effectively framed the
debate. Through a concerted effort, the credit card industry was able to
capture politicians through monetary contributions, influence the main
provisions of the BAPCPA for its benefit, and shape the perceptions of
the public to adopt its interests. The main provisions of the BAPCPA
are a manifestation of this effort.
VI. CONCLUSION
Stiglitz's The Price of Inequality effectively explores the
growing inequality concern in America. He succeeds in providing the
public and policymakers with a comprehensive discussion of the nature
of the problem, the factors leading to the problem, and why inequality
should be a national concern. As the case study on BAPCPA illustrates,
Stiglitz's arguments are borne out in practice. His theories on the
wealthy's influence over policymakers and public perception are
particularly illuminating in the bankruptcy reform example.
While Stiglitz does not spend much time on policy
252. Warren, supra note 236, at 12.
253. Id. at 13.
254. Id.
255. Simkovic, supra note 173, at 2.
256. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 162 ("[S]imple, distorted stories, often repeated, can be
more effective than longer and more subtle ones.").
257. Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 77, 86 (2004).
258. Warren, supra note 236, at 13 (arguing that it was nearly mathematically
impossible for any proposed bankruptcy reform to save each American family $400).
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considerations to solve the inequality problem, he does offer some
rudimentary proposed solutions. 259 For him, the most pressing factors
that need to be addressed are those that simultaneously weaken the
economy while at the same time further entrench inequality.
260
Specifically, Stiglitz proposes that the American government must curb
the rent seeking of the financial sector, 261 better enforce competition
laws, 262 reform the bankruptcy laws, 263 and create a more effective tax
code.264 Stiglitz believes that inequality has become so entrenched in
American society that it has become acceptable.265 In order for this to
change, the 99 percent needs to realize that wealth inequality is not
inevitable and that change can occur.26 6 The Occupy Wall Street
protests shows that there is hope; the rest of society must voice their
disapproval as well.
BRENDAN A. CAPPIELLO
259. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 165.
260. Id. at 81.
261. Id. at 269-70.
262. Id. at 270.
263. Id. at 271 (arguing that student loans should be changed from non-dischargeable to
dischargeable status, and that Chapter 7 should still be available for those needing a fresh
start, creating a more debtor-friendly Code while forcing banks to curtail any predatory
pricing strategies).
264. Id. at 273.
265. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 287.
266. Id.
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